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Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of 
unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid 
free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, 
in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional 
policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability 
either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, 
Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in 
Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect 
of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the 
effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank’s prime 
objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have 
implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU. 
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- Fiscal constraints are necessary in a monetary union to protect the central 
bank from free-riding regions that push for a monetary debt bail-out. 
- Fiscal profligacy at the regional level can be countered by a strong central 
bank, by a strong federal government or by a combination of both. 
- For Germany, we find evidence that the Bundesbank was protected from 
fiscally irresponsible regions by the federal government reducing deficits at 
the central level 
- The regulation of fiscal policies in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) may therefore require some fiscal power at the centre to protect the 




In June 2011, the then president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude Trichet, 
during a speech on receiving the Charlemagne Prize, called for the creation of a 
ministry of finance for the eurozone. His call for more powers for a European Treasury 
sounded unusual for a central banker. Economic theory has usually considered that a 
central bank, concerned about inflation, should be wary of a strong fiscal authority. 
As the argument goes, governments that are soft-nosed about employment wish to 
stimulate economic activity and therefore strain the central bank by pressuring for 
lower interest rates or higher inflation.1 Easier monetary conditions would also take 
off the pressure of a loose fiscal stance and make it easier to run debt-financed 
deficits. According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), if the government 
fails to take action to ensure solvency, then monetary policy can only give in to this 
active use of fiscal policy and eventually loses control over the price level. Fiscal 
- rather than monetary – policy determines the price level then.2 Economists are 
therefore concerned with making central bankers sufficiently conservative on price 
stability and restricting the manoeuvring room of governments with fiscal rules.3 
 
This is all the more necessary in a monetary union such as the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).4 The common central bank faces various fiscal authorities 
which wish to shift the economic and political cost of fiscal adjustment from the local 
population onto the rest of the union. A monetary bail-out by the central bank would 
generate inflation for all countries: it is even sufficient to have one insolvent 
government that sets policy actively to have it determine the price level for the union 
as a whole.5,6,7 This free riding exacerbates the need to control fiscal profligacy with 
fiscal rules.8 The common central bank should be as conservative as possible in order 
not to give in to the pressure of debt accumulation.9,10 One way to achieve a strong 
common central bank is by keeping the fiscal authorities divided. Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1998) and Chari and Kehoe (2004) argue that the absence of a single 
fiscal power reinforces the position of the single central bank, since there can be no 
direct bail-out and free riding also weakens possible agreements between various 
                                                     
1 Barro and Gordon, 1983; Svensson, 1997. 
2 Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994. 
3 Dixit and Lambertini (2003) qualify this result for more general settings of the policy game. 
4 Dixit, 2001; Chari and Kehoe, 2004. 
5 Bergin, 2000. 
6 Except in the case in which this price level would be exactly right to offset the debt position of other 
governments. 
7 The FTPL has been extended to open economies by Dupor (2000) and Daniel (2001), and to explain 
first-generation currency crises (Daniel, 2010) or constraints on fiscal policy in monetary union (Sims, 
1999; Woodford, 2001; Daniel and Shiamptanis, 2012). The type of constraints that, according to 
Buiter (2002) or Niepelt (2004), make the FTPL inconsistent with equilibrium behaviour do not 
always bind in this case, as expectations of sudden currency devaluation, redenomination or free riding 
create the possibility of active and passive fiscal regimes in equilibrium. 
8 Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999. 
9 Chari and Kehoe, 2004. 
10 Failure to commit results in excessive debt accumulation (Jensen, 1996; Beetsma and Bovenberg, 
2003). 
fiscal authorities on how to share the burden of a bail-out. In the EMU, a non-existent 
EU budget, together with the deficit rule of the Stability and Growth Pact (or, after 
its 2012 reform, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, 
which includes the Fiscal Compact) and the no-bail-out clause of the Treaty, was 
supposed to separate responsibilities between the various national fiscal authorities 
and seal in price stability as the sole objective of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Given these settings, the ECB is arguably the most powerful institution in the 
eurozone. Some argue it uses this political power to push its own agenda of economic 
and institutional reform.11 
 
So why would the former ECB President push for the creation of a single fiscal 
authority that would diminish the ECB’s privileged position? There is a risk of 
overburdening the central bank with fiscal powers due to the lack of fiscal transfers 
between fiscal authorities. The game-theoretic models on policy interaction have 
typically downplayed the possibility of fiscal transfers. A crucial assumption in Chari 
and Kehoe (2004) is that the fiscal authorities can only ask the common central bank 
for a monetary bail-out, whereas a fiscal bail-out between them is not possible. The 
implicit argument is that a sovereign cannot be asked to tax its own citizens to finance 
public goods and transfer wealth permanently to citizens in other countries.12 By 
contrast, in a federation, this limit is not binding and transfer systems do exist. The 
literature on fiscal federalism basically examines why regions free ride on the 
fiscal efforts of the federation as a whole and how fiscal powers should be distributed 
accordingly. Regional tax autonomy is rarely complete – due to a constitutionally 
determined division of spending tasks across tiers of government and varying 
economic conditions that cause differences in tax capacity – so revenue sharing 
agreements, which consist either of horizontal transfers between regional 
governments or of vertical transfers from the federal government, open the door to 
fiscal indiscipline.1313 Soft budget constraints mean that, ex ante, tax sharing 
agreements and joint spending schemes provide implicit additional financing of 
regional budgets. Ex post, in extreme cases, this may even entail an explicit bail-out. 
Policy recommendations for fiscal federations are akin to the ones for monetary 
union: if tax autonomy is not possible, federal governments should have a politically 
stronger position to enforce fiscal rules and constrain regional debt accumulation.14 
 
With a strong central bank or a strong federal treasury, fiscal discipline and economic 
stability can be achieved. But if one of them becomes weak towards regional fiscal 
authorities, perhaps because of the negative economic consequences of a default by 
a fiscal authority, it becomes prone to political pressures to bail out. Commitment by 
the other authority is then still sufficient for fiscal discipline and economic stability. 
On the one hand, the federal government can act on regional budgets so as to shield 
the central bank from the negative consequences of active fiscal policies. If it is strong, 
                                                     
11 Bergsten and Kierkegaard, 2011. 
12 Sims, 1999. 
13 The variety of fiscal arrangements and rules in different countries is discussed in Rodden, Eskeland 
and Litvack (2003). 
14 Rodden, Eskeland and Litvack, 2003; Ter-Minassian, 2007. 
it can force the region to adjust by applying fiscal rules. But even if it is weak and likely 
to bail out, it may still achieve overall budget balance by compensating for insolvency 
at the regional level with a stricter central budget or, alternatively, by shifting 
resources between regional governments. Active regional fiscal policies do not give 
rise to pressures on the central bank then, as the general government budget is 
balanced and so price stability is achievable for the central bank. On the other hand, 
the central bank can stand firm and not provide a monetary bail-out to the regions and 
thereby also reinforce the negotiating position of the federal government vis-a`-vis 
the regions. 
 
Of course, a strong federal treasury may grow as a challenger to the central bank. A 
soft-nosed federal government may perhaps wish to force a looser monetary stance, 
as the literature on the interaction between a central bank and the government shows.15 
But this policy conflict is subdued in the presence of a third player that may cause 
negative externalities on the other two players. The latter will cooperate to beat the third 
player rather than engage in a row between themselves.16 Hence, Jean-Claude Trichet 
calls for a European Treasury as he considers that the European Central Bank is not 
fully protected from fiscal indiscipline at regional level, owing to the lack of political 
structures at EMU level to enforce the fiscal constraints in the regions. 
 
In this paper, we give evidence for this proposition by testing the interaction between 
the central bank, the federal government and regional budgets. To that end, we use a 
test developed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) for distinguishing active from 
passive fiscal regimes. This test looks into the responses of shocks to the surplus ratio 
on public debt, and the autocorrelation properties of the surplus. Other papers too have 
tested the implications of FTPL in a monetary union, but do so on a country-by-
country basis.17 The main contribution of our paper is to extend the test to look at the 
interaction between different tiers of government. We do so by a comparison of the 
test results between general government, central government and the regional tiers of 
government. 
 
An interesting example of a federal country with soft budget constraints in its fiscal 
system is Germany.18 The federal and regional ( Länder) governments have important 
fiscal powers, controlling about half each of total public spending. Fiscal 
homogeneity across German Länder requires the balancing of resources over 
different tiers of government and between economically weak and strong regions. 
This horizontal repartition of government revenues is explicitly written into the 
German Constitution. These transfers are complemented with vertical grants from the 
federal level to further reduce economic disparities and finance specific tasks. Despite 
the existence of constitutional deficit rules, regional debt problems have been 
common. The federal government needed to bail out two Länder in the early 1990s 
                                                     
15 Belke and Gros, 2009. 
16 Rogoff, 1985; Kehoe, 1989. 
17 Creel and Le Bihan, 2006; Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Esteve, 2009. 
18 Rodden, 2006. 
(Saarland and Bremen). Other evidence in Rodden (2006) shows that the more 
transfer- dependent regions in Germany have been slower than others in adjusting 
fiscal positions. We also find that some Länder are running unsustainable fiscal 
policies. These active policies furthermore spill over to the other regions: a panel 
VAR (vector autoregressive) model shows that, on aggregate, regional budgets are 
unsustainable. By contrast, federal fiscal policy is passive and it actually offsets 
regional fiscal problems, as we do not find evidence that fiscal series for the general 
government are active. The federal government shields the Bundesbank from active 
regional fiscal policies, so it could pursue an active policy with the prime objective 
of price stability. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We review briefly in Section II the theory of price 
determination developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995), to 
derive the empirical test of FTPL proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), 
and its application to different government tiers. In Section III, we discuss the federal 
fiscal structure in Germany. Results follow in Section IV. We conclude in Section V 
with some policy implications for the EMU. 
 
II. Testing the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level on different tiers of 
government 
 
1. The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
 
The flow government budget constraint describes the period-by-period dynamics of 
total nominal debt, Bt, as the accumulation due to the current primary surplus – which 
is the difference between government revenues, Tt, and government spending, Gt – 













All variables in equation 1 are expressed in nominal terms. 
 
We can rewrite the flow budget constraint in terms of total government liabilities, 

























































































where Pt and Yt are the price level and nominal GDP respectively. Equation 2 says 
that total government liabilities have to equal the primary surplus (as a ratio to GDP) 
– inclusive of seigniorage revenues – plus the discounted value of next period’s total 
liabilities. This discount factor is the ratio of real GDP growth to 1 plus the real 
interest rate. Let wt be the ratio of total liabilities to GDP, st the surplus to GDP ratio, 
and αt the discount factor, so as to simplify equation 2 to 
 
(3) 1++= tttt wsw α  
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There are two alternative views on equation 4. The common interpretation is that it is 
the present-value government budget constraint. By contrast, the FTPL does not 
interpret equation 4 as a constraint, but as an equilibrium condition that is always to be 
satisfied. The two views coincide when the government does not run unsustainable 
policies and eventually pays off, monetises or refinances debt. In this case, the 
government endogenously adjusts the sequence {st} so as to satisfy equation 4, 
regardless of the values of nominal income and the discount factors. If fiscal policy is 
sufficiently reactive to debt, the intertemporal budget constraint will be satisfied for all 
possible price paths. For the FTPL, this equilibrium implies that monetary policy 
retains the ability to control prices. Following Leeper (1991) or Woodford (1995), we 
call this the passive fiscal regime. However, if the government does not adjust st and 
the surplus is just an exogenous process unrelated to debt, then in order to satisfy 
equation 4, either the discount factor or liabilities have to adjust. This adjustment in wt 
can only happen through a jump in nominal income as nominal liabilities, Bt Mt, are 
given in each period. Only prices move to make equation 4 hold, and hence the price 
level is determined by equating the real value of nominal government debt with the 
present value of primary government budget surpluses. Hence, for the FTPL, if the 
fiscal authority fails to take action to ensure its intertemporal budget constraint is 
satisfied, it is still fiscal – rather than monetary – policy that is the nominal anchor for 
the economy. As government solvency eventually has to be ensured in real terms, 
monetary policy can only give in to fiscal pressure. Eventually, the responsibility for 
the price level is always in the hands of the fiscal authority. This type of equilibrium 
is called the active fiscal regime. 
 
The existence of these active regimes is not commonly accepted. In fact, they are 
considered by some theorists to be impossible to achieve as they are based on out-of-
equilibrium behaviour. Buiter (2002) argues that active fiscal policy would be 
inconsistent with overall economic constraints, as it requires anomalous paths for 
prices after the adjustment. The active regime can only exist because of some 
arbitrary constraints on policy behaviour. For example, Niepelt (2004) argues that 
economic agents would never buy government bonds that might later be revalued, 
making the FTPL inconsistent with equilibrium behaviour. 
 
2. Testing FTPL 
 
An empirical verification of the plausibility of active or passive regimes runs into 
some identification problems. Both regimes are observationally equivalent as we 
always observe the equilibrium outcome under each regime. It is not sufficient to see 
a positive response of the primary surplus to an increase in government liabilities to 
recognise a passive regime in which a higher surplus today pays off debt. The same 
positive relationship would also be observed in an active regime, but in this case the 
causality runs the other way as nominal liabilities rise with a jump in nominal income 
to match the expected higher value of present and future surpluses. 
 
To overcome this identification problem, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) 
propose a test that is based on (a) the response of liabilities to innovations in the 
surplus and (b) the serial correlation of the surplus.19 They distinguish between the 
two regimes on the grounds that a negative serial correlation of the surplus makes the 
active regime theoretically implausible. The argument runs as follows. A positive 
innovation in the surplus that moreover raises future surpluses implies that public 
debt is being paid off as government liabilities continue falling. This is a passive 
regime. An active regime would be obvious in two different cases. The first case 
happens when future liabilities rise after an innovation to the surplus and the shock 
to the surplus is positively correlated with future surpluses. This implies the surplus 
is set independently of the position of total liabilities, and nominal income jumps to 
ensure the equilibrium is satisfied. The second case occurs when the rise in the surplus 
does pay off debt, but due to the revaluation effect of nominal income in an active 
regime, liabilities increase. The net effect on the surplus is therefore nil, and the 
surplus does not serially correlate with future surpluses then. Nonetheless, there is 
also a third active regime that gives the same prediction for the fall in liabilities as 
under the passive regime. After a positive shock to the surplus, nominal income and/or 
the expected future fiscal surpluses must move to achieve fiscal balance in the active 
regime. Future liabilities would fall in an active regime if the shock to the surplus is 
negatively correlated with future surpluses. Given that we usually observe positive 
serial correlation in surpluses, it is only possible to make this occur if there were to be a 
strong negative correlation of the surplus at longer horizons. Moreover, these deficits 
would need to be large enough to make the present value of surpluses fall. This 
implies that deficits are so large, persistent or heavily discounted that they can offset 
the initial increase in the surplus, making policy active. 20 In a first step, we test to 
                                                     
19 For other attempts to test the FTPL, see Cochrane (1998), Hetzel and Leach (2001), Woodford 
(2001) 
and Sala (2004). 
20 Canzoneri et al. (2001) go on to argue that this negative correlation makes the active regime 
implausible. If the government decides to raise the surplus today, it would deliberately change its 
distinguish these three cases by looking at (a) the impulse responses of a VAR 
including the surplus and total liabilities and (b) the autocorrelation function of the 
surplus. 
 
The third case in this bivariate VAR test could be observationally equivalent to another 
passive regime, as pointed out by Cochrane (1998). His argument is that the observed 
surplus is the sum of a cyclical component, at, and a structural (or cyclically adjusted) 
component, zt. Assume that both components follow an AR process, as follows: 
 
(5) at = ηaat −1 + εa, 
 
(6) zt = ηzzt −1 + εz, 
 
(7) st = at + zt. 
 
Cochrane (1998) further argues that in the scenario that a government stabilises the 
surplus, a fall in the cyclical component of the surplus due to an economic slump may 
push the government to increase the structural component. As the persistence of this 
discretionary component is likely larger than that of the cyclical component (ηz > ηa), 
this would raise the value of outstanding debt under an active regime as this is the 
present discounted value of all future surpluses. However, with a VAR test, the 
negative correlation of the innovations to the cyclical and structural components 
makes a researcher looking at the inference in a bivariate VAR detect a fall in debt, 
leading to the belief that fiscal policy is passive. Hence, a negative response of public 
debt can be observed even after a positive shock on the primary surplus even in a so-
called active regime. Creel and Le Bihan (2006) therefore propose an extension of 
the VAR test proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), based on verifying 
the sign of the correlation of innovations to the cyclical and structural components of 
the primary surplus within the VAR. Rather than computing the contemporaneous 
correlations between the shocks to the cyclical and structural components, Creel and 
Le Bihan suggest taking into account lagged cross-correlations between these two 
series. They do so by computing the forward value of real debt under the active 
regime as the sum of expected surpluses: 
 
(8) 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 = ∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗� =∑𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡�𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗 + 𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗� 
 
Using the fact that the expectation of the total surplus k periods ahead is the forward 
solution k periods ahead of the VAR, the total value of debt then becomes 
 
(9) b∞ = eβA(I − βA)−1Pg1, 
 
                                                     
policy into a deficit at some time in the future. But given that the surplus in an active regime is 
determined by an exogenous process, this change in policy should happen for some exogenous reason 
that is not related to the level of public debt. Cochrane (1998) makes some suggestions on models 
explaining this behaviour of the government. 
= = 
where e (1,1), g (1,0), A is the coefficient matrix and P the Cholesky decomposition 
of the covariance matrix of the bivariate VAR in cyclical and structural components, 
at and zt. Even with uncorrelated contemporaneous innovations and under an active 
regime, the offsetting effects of the cyclical and structural components might 
eventually produce a negative response of real debt after a positive shock to the total 
surplus. Hence, we cannot just reject the active regime on grounds of a negative 
response of public debt to a positive surplus shock, but must consider the correlation 
between cyclical and structural components of the budget surplus. 
 
In the first stage, we follow Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) and use a VAR model 
that includes the surplus and total liabilities and also controls for the discount factor.21 
In order to allow for the jump in nominal income in the active regime, the surplus and 
total liabilities are expressed as a ratio to GDP. The identification assumption 
employed is a simple Cholesky ordering. Both orderings of surplus and debt are 
equally likely. If we order the surplus first, the innovation to the surplus is indeed an 
exogenous shock. This makes more sense in an active regime as it allows for a 
contemporaneous response in the liabilities ratio: nominal GDP (or discount factors) 
jumps to ensure that outstanding liabilities equal the expected present value of 
surpluses. By contrast, if we order liabilities first, nominal GDP might be determined 
exogenously. We can identify a shock to the surplus that does not have a 
contemporaneous impact on liabilities. This ordering would favour a passive regime. 
A rise or a non- significant response of liabilities to a shock in the surplus indicates 
active fiscal policy. A fall in liabilities is only consistent with an active regime in the 
case of the surplus displaying negative serial correlation. 
 
In a second stage, we then use the cyclical and structural components of the total 
surplus series and initially check the degree of autocorrelation of each component to 
see whether the assumption of Cochrane (1998) – that structural deficits are more 
persistent – holds. We run a bivariate VAR to compute expression 9. If boo is negative, 
then we cannot reject the active regime, as the interaction between the cyclical and 
structural components of the primary surplus is such that Cochrane’s example is 
verified in the data. We suppose the VAR can be identified by a Cholesky 
decomposition, where the cyclical surplus is ordered before the structural surplus. In 
computing, we set β equal to 0.98, as in Creel and Le Bihan (2006), as this parameter 
is the discount factor and equal to 1 minus the growth-corrected interest rate, which 
is about 0.02 in Germany. We consequently look at the impulse response function of 
a shock to each component on debt. This VAR is an unrestricted version of the test 
in Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) as we do not assume the active regime to hold 
but look directly at the properties of the dynamic effect on debt of a shock to the 
primary surplus. This VAR has a Cholesky ordering with the cyclical surplus before 
the structural surplus and government liabilities. 
                                                     
21 The stochastic discount factors {αt} may move as well to make equation 4 hold in equilibrium. A 
negative correlation of surpluses with future discount factors would make the passive regime more 
plausible. In our specification of the VAR, we simply control for exogenous discount factors, as these 
are similar for all regional governments in any case. Robustness checks with endogenous {αt} confirm 
the main results. 
 
3. A test for interaction between central bank, federal government and 
regions 
 
Other papers have used the test developed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) to 
test fiscal regimes on general government data.22 Some papers have inferred the 
consequences for the European Central Bank from the passive or active policy 
response in the EMU on a country-by-country basis23 but finish testing at this stage. 
We take the test a few steps further and extend it to different government tiers. A 
comparison of the test results between general government and all tiers of 
government allows us to infer the interaction between the regional governments, the 
federal government and the central bank. First, we know that an active policy of a 
single regional government is sufficient to make fiscal policy active for all 
governments of the same tier. We thus need to test first whether each regional 
government runs an active or passive fiscal policy. Then, if we find that fiscal policy 
is active in at least one region, the empirical prediction is that regional fiscal policies 
are in a passive regime on aggregate.24 We verify this proposition by testing the 
surplus– debt relation in a panel VAR of all regions together. However, the federal 
government may internalise the spillover effect of active policies on the price level. 
If there is indeed free riding among regional governments, the federal government 
may compensate for this with a passive policy. Nonetheless, it is not sufficient that 
the federal government follows a passive policy. It should be passive enough that the 
consolidated general government budget series is in a passive regime. We therefore 
run the FTPL test first on federal government data and consequently on general 
government data. 
 
Testing the FTPL on different government levels involves some issues over the data to 
use, owing to the difference between regionally and federally defined data. Strictly 
speaking, government liabilities include government debt as well as the money base 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. A division of the money base on a 
regional basis is not possible since its division is not considered relevant in a 
monetary union. Moreover, in many countries, including Germany, the constitution 
prohibits direct central bank financing of regional budgets. As a consequence, we 
choose to exclude the money base also from the federal and general government data. 
A second issue is the discount factors to use. We may approximate these with the yield 
on one-year government bonds. However, regional interest rates on government 
bonds are available over a brief period only and the spreads between regional interest 
rates are negligible.25 We choose the federation’s interest rate – a short-term bond 
yield – but since this is an exogenous variable for the regions, we also take it as an 
                                                     
22 Tanner and Ramos (2003) for Brazil, Janssen, Nolan and Thomas (2002) for the UK and Thams 
(2007) for Germany and Spain. 
23 Creel and Le Bihan, 2006; Bajo-Rubio, Diaz-Roldan and Esteve, 2009. 
24 Sims, 1999; Bergin, 2000. 
25 Fitch, 2005. 
= 
exogenous control variable in the surplus–debt relation.26 
 
III. Fiscal federalism in Germany 
 
Germany is an interesting example to test fiscal regimes at different government 
levels. It is a monetary union with a central bank that has been renowned for its strong 
adherence to low inflation. The memory of fiscal trouble and the hyperinflation of 
the 1920s imposed upon the Bundesbank’s monetary policy the strict task of price 
stability. Both the federal government and the 16 regional governments (Länder) 
have important fiscal powers. German regional policies are as important as the federal 
budget in determining the overall budget balance. Each has control of about half of 
total public spending. However, the Länder have little control over tax income, and 
most revenues come from shared taxes and grants. There are vertical fiscal transfers 
between the federal government and the Länder, but also horizontal ones among the 
Länder. The reason is that the fiscal system stresses fiscal homogeneity, which 
requires the balancing of resources over different tiers of government and between 
economically weak and strong regions. This horizontal repartition of government 
revenues (Länderfinanzausgleich) is explicitly written into the German Constitution. 
These transfers are complemented with vertical grants from the federal level to 
further reduce economic disparities and to finance specific tasks.27 
 
The federal fiscal system in Germany is susceptible to soft budget constraints and 
fiscal problems have been rather common.28 Deficits are only allowed to finance 
investment, yet despite this constitutionally anchored restriction, this golden rule has 
been repeatedly breached. The federal government even came to the rescue of two 
Länder in the early 1990s (Saarland and Bremen) with a bail-out after the 
Constitutional Court ruled that the federation is responsible for maintaining equal 
living conditions in the entire territory.29 
 
We can illustrate this deficit and debt bias with a look at the budget data. Data cover 
the period 1970–2005 and are annual. We finish the sample in 2005 as a major reform 
of the German fiscal system took place in that year. Data on German fiscal policies 
come from different sources. General government series are from the OECD.30 Data 
for the federal government are available from the Public Finances Series of the 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.1). Regional budget data were 
provided by the Ministry of Finance. Land GDP, to express the deficit and debt as a 
ratio to GDP, comes from the revised data from the Volkswirtschaftliche 
                                                     
26 Robustness checks with endogenous {αt} confirm our main results. 
27 The equalisation scheme first pools 25 per cent of VAT from all Länder and reallocates this quantity 
to the Länder with the lowest tax revenues (in terms of per-capita tax income) so that they reach 95 per 
cent of their financial capacity. The federal government supplements this with grants so that all Länder 
achieve at least 99.5 per cent of their financial capacity (Seitz, 1999). 
28 Rodden, 2006. 
29 Seitz, 1999. 
30 We cleaned the German data for the sale of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 
licences, which had an unusually large budget impact in 2000. 
Gesamtrechnungen der Länder. As these sources do not provide a decomposition of 
regional and central government budget data into their cyclical and structural 
components, we decompose the total surplus by applying an HP filter with λ 100.31 
Some further notes on the budget data are necessary in our set-up. First, fiscal data 
are consolidated across Länder and towns.32 These series further include the 
horizontal transfers between Länder, and the vertical transfers from the federal 
government in order to check for the flows between different tiers of government. 
Second, all deficit series are net of interest payments, so we can apply the FTPL tests 
directly on the different series. Finally, no budget series are available for regional 
public investment, so the budget data for all tiers of government include this series. 
Including public investment in the test might create a problem if potential output is 
boosted, with positive effects on the regional budget balances in the longer term. 
This might be problematic for our tests, as productive regional public investment 
would bias the results against the finding of active fiscal policy, as described by 
Cochrane (1998). This point might not be very important, however. Public investment 
in Germany has been on a secular decline since the 1980s,33 and is the lowest among the 
G7 countries (at less than 2 per cent in 2006); hence the budget data are not affected 
much. Moreover, Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau (2001) and Potrafke and Reischmann 
(2015) show that the German fiscal system has created perverse incentives and 
constrained those government activities that enhance economic growth. As a Land 
bears the cost of public investment, most of the additional tax revenues resulting from 
higher growth are transferred to other regions by the design of the equalisation 
scheme. Government investment at regional level has therefore been rather limited. As 
a check, we derive the structural budget data and test the validity of active or passive 
fiscal policies, as in Creel and Le Bihan (2006). 
 
The aggregate deficit of the Länder has been quite constant since the 1970s at about 1 
per cent (Figure 1). Most of the variation in the general government balance is due to 
changes in the federal government’s fiscal stance. These reflect the strong spending 
boost of the Brandt government around 1976, German Reunification in 1991 and the 
consolidation since entry into the EMU in 1999. The federal government and the 
Länder contribute in almost equal proportions of 30 per cent to the overall debt 
position. German Reunification has been nearly completely financed by federal debt 
issues. In recent years, the federal government contributes about 10 per cent more than 
the regional tier to overall debt. 
 
The deficit ratios for the 16 German Länder are displayed in Figure 2. The situations 
of the three city states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg) and the smallest German region 
(Saarland) are illustrative of the evolution of the public finances of all Länder. The first 
characteristic concerns the bailed-out states. The peak in deficits in Saarland and 
Bremen in 1993 shows the enormous fiscal havoc in both states that eventually led to 
the federal bail-out in 1993. The continuous financial support to both regions has only 
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32 Aggregation is necessary to maintain consistency of the results between city states and other Länder. 
33 Mehrotra and Välilä, 2006. 
in part led to a reduction in deficits, and deficits have continued to grow in recent years. 
A second striking feature of Figure 2 is the dramatic increase in Berlin’s budget deficit. 
This is part of a phenomenon observed in all former East German Länder. Deficits 
quickly shot up directly after Reunification as the new states faced very large spending 
responsibilities at a moment when economic transition caused revenues to fall.34 A 
large gap between the two sides of the budget persisted until 1994. At that point, these 
states entered the Finanzausgleich system and were entitled to extra revenues. The 
consequent increase in revenues brought state budgets closer to balance. In contrast 
to Berlin, most former East German states have been able to contain deficits to a level 
that is only slightly higher than in the old Länder. A final feature of the fiscal 
behaviour of lower tiers is the build- up of deficits during the 1980s in the old Länder. 
After Reunification, these Länder kept deficits under control, but this has become 
more difficult in recent years. Deficits have started to grow again in all Länder. As a 
consequence, the steady position of debt in a range of about 10–25 per cent across 
West German Länder has not been kept (Figure 3). The evolution of debt highlights 
the same differences in deficits in the eastern and western Länder. Public debt levels 
in the eastern Länder seem to converge to the German average of about 35 per cent. 
Berlin and Bremen, and to a lesser extent Hamburg and Saarland, are accumulating 




1. The spillover of regional fiscal policies 
 
Let us first look at the behaviour of the fiscal policies of the Länder. In  a first step, we 
report the sign of the debt response after an innovation in the surplus. For parsimony, 
we present in table format the accumulated responses at horizons of two, five and 
eight years and their significance (here at 95 per cent asymptotic error bounds).36 We 
present in the main part the results for a VAR in which liabilities are ordered first.37 
Table 1 shows that the accumulated response to a surplus shock is negative in most 
Länder. This response is also significant in most cases. Moreover, the autocorrelation 
function in Table 2 shows that surpluses are positively correlated. This indicates that 
most regions are running a passive policy. There are a few exceptions, in which fiscal 
policy is active. First, a shock to the surplus in Hessen is followed by rises in liabilities. 
Given that the surplus is positively serially correlated, fiscal policy must be active. 
Second, there are two Länder – Bremen and Hamburg – where the response of 
liabilities is not significant after a surplus shock. With positive serial correlation for 
at least three years after the shock, fiscal policy can be classified as active. Finally, 
                                                     
34 The only exception here is Sachsen. 
35 Berlin applied for federal government intervention in October 2006, but its request was repealed by 
the Federal Constitutional Court. 
36 The VAR is estimated on the levels of the series, which still provides consistent estimates even if 
the surplus or debt is non-stationary (Lütkepohl, 1991), as Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest may be the case. 
37 Since German Reunification has implied a major overhaul, we control for this shift with an impulse 
dummy and a time trend as of 1991. The BIC test indicates that the optimal length of the VAR is two 
years. 
the surplus to GDP ratios in Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Schleswig Holstein and 
Thüringen display negative serial correlation at short horizons. In Niedersachsen, 
the serial correlation turns negative after only one year. At longer horizons, this 
negative correlation becomes even larger, but is hardly significant. In Thüringen by 
contrast, the correlation becomes negative after two years and is large and significant. 
At longer horizons, it turns positive again. For both Länder, this again indicates an 
active regime. 
 
In a second step, we check whether the results are still valid after decomposing the 
surplus into its cyclical and structural components. We find that in all cases the 
persistence of the structural component is significantly higher than that of the cyclical 
component (columns 4 and 5 of Table 1), which is in line with the assumption of 
Cochrane (1998). Hence, the result for an active regime might be invalidated by 
looking at the bivariate VAR. However, in all regions, the computation of the present 
value of real debt (boo) results in positive numbers (column 6). This result indicates 
that we would not inadvertently observe a passive regime even if an active regime 
prevails. Hence, this check confirms the results of the bivariate VAR. We further 
estimate a VAR including the cyclical surplus, the structural surplus and total debt. 
The impulse response functions after a positive innovation to either the cyclical or the 
structural surplus are very similar to the ones reported in columns 1 to 3 of Table 1 
and are therefore not reported in the paper. The debt to GDP ratio falls in all regions 
except Bremen, Hamburg and Hessen. This confirms the existence of an active regime 
in those three regions. 
 
Can we associate these active regimes with a particular fiscal policy? The results 
should probably not come as a surprise. Bremen was one of the two regions to be 
bailed out by the federal government in 1993 after debt reached nearly 50 per cent of 
regional GDP. In contrast, Hessen and Hamburg have been running very stable fiscal 
policies. Actually, both are among the richest German regions in terms of per-capita 
income and are important net contributors to the Finanzausgleich. The surpluses they 
create are skimmed off to regions with fiscal trouble, which causes a political stir from 
these net contributors.38 
 
What does the active policy imply for the interaction between different regional 
governments? An active policy in a single region suffices to make the regime active 
for all regions. We confirm this hypothesis on two accounts. First, we run a panel VAR 
with the same specification as the basic model. The initial response to a shock in the 
surplus is a rise in liabilities. At longer horizons, liabilities start to fall but this fall is 
never significant (Table 1). Regional fiscal policy can clearly be classified as active. 
For the panel version, of course, we cannot compute the serial correlation of this 
‘panel’ surplus, nor that of its components. It is therefore hard to assess the 
implication for Cochrane’s (1998) argument. However, the present value of real debt 
from a panel version of the bivariate VAR in the cyclical and structural surpluses is 
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imbalances. 
positive (Table 1, column 6), and hence would lead us to reject an interpretation of 
this result as a passive regime. 
 
Second, we aggregate the regional budget data. The results for the different Länder 
have already suggested that horizontal transfers might offset active policies as 
transfers flow from rich to poor regions. By aggregating the surplus series, we net out 
the effect of horizontal transfers between regions. The finding of an active regime for 
this hypothetical composite regional government should then be stronger. Indeed, the 
impulse response function (IRF) after a surplus shock shows that liabilities continue 
to rise for at least 10 years after the shock (Figure 4). The IRF is computed for a one 
standard deviation shock to the surplus ratio, and is plotted with 95 per cent 
asymptotic error bounds. As the serial correlation of this hypothetical surplus is 
positive, regional fiscal policy is certainly in an active regime. Although the aggregate 
structural surplus is rather more persistent than the cyclical surplus, boo is positive; 
hence we can reject an interpretation of this regime as a passive one. Furthermore, the 
VAR including the cyclical and structural surpluses together with government debt in 
Figure 5 shows that the impulse response of government liabilities is positive, 
particularly after a shock to the structural surplus. This set of results confirms the 
spillover effect of an active regime in a few regions to all other tiers of government 
in the monetary union. 
 
As the German fiscal system has undergone quite some changes since 1970, we check 
whether the regimes may vary over time. The Reunification of Germany is, of course, 
a major break. The federal government initially bore the brunt of the burden and 
financed the transition with public debt. We therefore analyse two different sample 
periods: 1970–90 for the old Länder and 1991– 2005 for both the new and old Länder. 
Although the former East German regions have been incorporated in the 
Finanzausgleich only since 1995, the system had already been adapted in anticipation 
of this event in 1991. 
 
We find that splitting the sample period in 1990 does not lead to different results 
(Table 3). The German fiscal system is characterised by active regimes both before 
and after Reunification. Before 1990, the VAR on the aggregate regional budget 
indicates an active regime, whereas the panel VAR does not. After 1990, a few 
regions follow active policies, and the overall regime is active. The reform of the fiscal 
system has affected the amount of transfers, but has not led to an overhaul of the 
interactions between the federal government, the central bank and the regions. Similar 
results hold for the VAR based on the cyclical and structural surpluses, and public 
debt. 
 
2. The federal budget offsets active regional policies 
 
Does fiscal profligacy at the regional level affect the decisions of the federal 
government? It can only shield the Bundesbank from the fiscal pressure of the Länder 
if it manages to balance the active regime with a budget that responds to the level of 
outstanding liabilities. To do this, the federal government should run a passive policy. 
This policy is what we actually find in the VAR. Future liabilities fall after a positive 
innovation to the surplus (Table 1 and Figure 6). The positive serial correlation (Table 
2) makes us discard the possibility of an active regime. The second-stage test on the 
cyclical and structural surpluses further corroborates the finding. On the one hand, the 
structural surplus is more persistent than the cyclical one, and the computation of the 
present value of real debt is positive, which supports the evidence of a passive regime. 
On the other hand, a VAR including the structural and cyclical surpluses results in a 
similarly negative response of outstanding liabilities (Figure 7). 
 
Even if the federal budget is passive, the federal government’s policy may not be 
passive enough to offset the effect of the active policies of the Länder. The previous 
results showed that the federal government has never provided sufficient (vertical) 
transfers to regions in order to offset fiscal indiscipline. 
 
However, if the federal government is to protect the central bank, it must then do so 
by compensating within its own budget and make the general government budget 
passive. We can analyse this by looking at consolidated data on general government. 
The impulse response function shows that liabilities continue to fall after a positive 
shock to the surplus (Table 1 and Figure 8). Moreover, with positive autocorrelation in 
the general government surplus (Table 2), fiscal policy can only be passive. The 
second-stage test including the cyclical and structural surpluses gives further support 
for this finding. As the structural surplus is more persistent than the cyclical one, and 
the computation of the present value of real debt is positive, the regime is likely to 
be passive. In addition, a VAR including the structural and cyclical surpluses results 
in a similarly negative response of total outstanding liabilities after a shock to either 
the cyclical or the structural surplus (Figure 9). Hence, fiscal policy is overall passive 
in Germany. This confirms similar findings by Creel and Le Bihan (2006) and Thams 
(2007) on general government data. We moreover show that this passive regime is 
the combination of active regional policies and a passive federal budget. The latter 
compensates the spillover effect of the former on aggregate economic variables.39 
 
This result has implications for monetary policy and the German fiscal system. Let 
us turn to monetary policy first. An aggregate passive fiscal policy does not guarantee 
the economy is on a stable path overall. This still depends on the interaction with 
monetary policy. With a passive fiscal policy, an active monetary policy that lets the 
short-term interest rate react more than proportionally to deviations in the inflation 
rate is required.40 Estimation of a monetary rule should reveal whether the behaviour 
of the Bundesbank is consistent with the passive fiscal regime and follows the ‘Taylor 
principle’, which states that the response to inflation should be greater than unity. 
Although not all industrial economies have pursued an active monetary policy over 
                                                     
39 The result is robust over different sample periods. Despite the burden of Reunification on the federal 
budget, federal policy follows a passive regime both before and after 1990 (Table 3). Over both 
periods, this passive policy is offsetting the active regional policy. 
40 Leeper, 1991. 
different periods as the empirical evidence in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) 
suggests, the Bundesbank is unequivocally considered to have been the main central 
bank that has stuck to active policy during most of its existence.41 The Bundesbank 
has always followed its mandate by giving priority to price stability. Beyer et al. 
(2008) characterise the Bundesbank’s monetary policy strategy with a Taylor rule 
using real-time data and find that, since the introduction of money targets in the early 
1970s, the Bundesbank has always maintained a strong anti-inflationary component 
in its policy stance. While the European Central Bank has inherited most of its 
structure from the Bundesbank, some studies argue that euro interest rates are low 
relative to the Bundesbank benchmark,42 but most studies using real-time data to 
estimate Taylor rules confirm that the ECB has been pursuing an active policy.43 This 
would then still imply a determinate combination for German fiscal policy in the 
EMU period from 1999 to 2005. 
 
The results also tell us something about the development of fiscal relations in 
Germany. We find that some regions pursue passive policies, while others do not. The 
finding of an active regime for the aggregate regional budget suggests that horizontal 
transfers mitigate unsustainable policies but are insufficient to stem the effects of 
fiscal indiscipline. The Finanzausgleich compensates between regions. But the 
regions are still in deficit on aggregate. Only vertical federal transfers offset the active 
regimes at regional level. A reverse transfer -through federal taxes- must then 
logically occur from at least some regions in order to make the passive policy of the 
federal government possible. As the federal government taxes all citizens in all 
regions, it must tax the regional resources relatively more to pursue its passive policy. 
Only in this way can it compensate sufficiently within its own budget to make fiscal 
policy passive on aggregate. This has implications for the role of the federal 
government over time. The financing of regional deficits strengthens its bargaining 
position, and the implicit tax transfers eventually allow the federal government to 
finance more tasks than regions do. The increasing role of the German federal 





In a federation, regional governments may pursue unsustainable fiscal policies and free 
ride on the efforts of other fiscal authorities, the federal government or the common 
central bank to come to their rescue. Such active policies would spur inflation across 
the monetary union as monetary policy loses control over prices.45 Commitment by 
either the central bank or the federal government not to bail out regional governments 
is sufficient to maintain fiscal discipline. To ensure regional governments pursue 
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42 Faust, Rogers and Wright, 2001. 
43 See Cimadomo (2016) for an overview. 
44 Seitz, 1999. 
45 Leeper, 1991; Bergin, 2000. 
passive fiscal policies requires credible rules. Depending on its political situation, the 
federal government can enforce deficit or debt rules, especially as it may provide the 
necessary fiscal means to pay off debt. Ex ante, tax sharing agreements and joint 
spending schemes provide implicit additional financing of regional budgets. Ex post, 
in extreme cases, this may even entail an explicit bail-out. This fiscal backstop makes 
monetary commitment more credible. At the same time, credibility of the central bank 
reinforces the position of the federal government. 
 
We use a test developed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001) for distinguishing 
passive from active fiscal regimes to give evidence on the interaction between 
different tiers of government by using data on the federal and regional budgets in 
Germany. The main finding is that the spillover effects from the regions that are 
running unsustainable fiscal policies are indeed countered by the federal government. 
Federal fiscal policy has provided a mechanism to avoid fiscal policies on aggregate 
being active. In this way, the federal government has protected the independence of 
the Bundesbank. 
 
There are other examples of federations in which regional fiscal policies create 
macroeconomic havoc, with implications for monetary policy. The relationships 
between the federal and regional governments depend on historical circumstances.46 
In some federations, a strong centre can impose strict rules on weak regional 
governments. But in others, a weak federal government could instead be in the political 
hands of the regions, and be fiscally too weak to stand between the regions and the 
central bank. In Argentina, for example, the fiscal power balance is tilted towards the 
regions, and the federal government has little control over the general budget.47 This 
structure explains the inability of the Argentinian government to rein in debt and 
follow a fiscal rule that would bring down primary deficits sufficiently to stave off the 
currency crisis of 2001.48 In November 2001, the Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo 
had to give in eventually to the pressure from loose budgets run in previous years by 
provincial governors. As a consequence, the central bank could not honour its 
commitment to convert pesos to dollars any more, and the currency board, which tied 
the peso to the dollar at parity, had to be abandoned. All internal debt was converted 
to pesos but this was not enough to restructure public debt and eventually Argentina 
defaulted on 75 per cent of its dollar- denominated outstanding debt.49 These events 
pushed inflation up to 60 per cent in early 2002. According to Uribe (2006) and Daniel 
(2010), this episode of hyperinflation was the jump in prices required to equate the 
value of debt to the present value of surpluses. 
 
In the EMU, the European Central Bank had arguably been shielded from this type 
of fiscal pressure. With no single fiscal power, the Stability and Growth Pact, and the 
no-bail-out clause of the Treaty, fiscal responsibilities lay with national fiscal 
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authorities.50 However, as the Financial Crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis in 
the eurozone, this set-up has not proven stable enough, as both fiscal and monetary 
bail-outs have been necessary.51 A single European Treasury, as called for by Jean-
Claude Trichet, would shield the European Central Bank from undue pressure by 
national fiscal policies, free it from taking up fiscal policy tasks through its 
responsibility for the banking system, and render more credible its commitment to 
price stability, as it would enable tools to more forcefully control national fiscal 
policy. Worries that a single European Treasury could become a challenger to the 
European Central Bank are founded, but the outcome depends on the kind of authority 
it may be given, as argued in Belke and Gros (2009). A European Treasury that 
controls national budgets and enforces fiscal rules need not employ a large budget itself. 
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Accumulated IRFs of the liabilities–GDP ratio to a shock in the surplus ratioa 
 
aCholesky ordering, liabilities ordered first. VAR with two lags. Impulse response for a shock of one standard 
deviation. ∗ indicates significance at 95 per cent asymptotic bounds. 
bData are for the period 1991–2005. cPanel VAR includes only the old Länder. 
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aCholesky ordering, liabilities ordered first. VAR with two lags. Impulse response for a shock of one standard 
deviation. ∗ indicates significance at 95 per cent asymptotic bounds. 
 
